Authoritarian turn: The Western Balkans’ move towards EU membership and away from democracy

On 1 February 2017, Florian Bieber (University of Graz, Austria) spoke at SEESOX about the authoritarian turn in the Western Balkans and how the region simultaneously moves away from democracy and progresses towards EU membership. The event was part of SEESOX’s Hilary Term seminar series dedicated to the rise of illiberalism in South East Europe and chaired by Richard Caplan (Linacre College, Oxford). 

Bieber started his talk by recalling the ten rules a contemporary Machiavelli would give the Balkan princes, a blog he wrote two years ago that still seems very relevant today––so relevant indeed that it recently received an update. In fact, there is widespread consensus that Western Balkan states have been moving backwards in terms of democratisation in the recent decade and particular states such as Serbia or Macedonia are more authoritarian today than they have been ten years ago. Yet EU officials still claim that the process of EU integration is intact and progressing, in defiance of the realities on the ground.  Today, the Balkan princes operate in a changed environment, as Bieber explained. The European Union is in crisis (Brexit, migration crisis, etc.) while we may observe a rise of authoritarianism, both globally (Turkey, US) and within the EU (Poland, Hungary). Furthermore, the return of geopolitics has changed how we perceive of the Balkans. The focus is not on the transformation of institutions and values anymore but on interest politics of great powers. The EU’s wish for e.g. Macedonia to act as Europe’s border guard in the migration crisis, the discussions surrounding Montenegro’s NATO accession, or the conscious EU choice to let the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue trump domestic reform processes in both countries have to be seen against this background. 

Naturally, this context affects the Balkan leaders. They show a strategic and limited commitment to democracy and rely on informal and illicit mechanisms of control. For strategic reasons––i.e. domestic support, external legitimacy for their rule, and economic integration––they remain committed to EU integration while reforms become apocryphal Potemkin’s villages. Granted, the EU integration process has produced some results, particularly with respect to the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue or institutional reforms. But it has also allowed these states to move away from democracy. 

Bieber explained this paradox by pointing to three causes. Firstly, on the domestic level, the democratic forces that were active in the early 2000s failed to build strong institutions. This institutional weakness enabled post-democrats to take hold of the state. Secondly, global circumstances have become favourable for this kind of domestic elite behaviour. The idea of liberal democracy has been challenged, the economic crisis has become more or less permanent, and alternative geopolitical actors such as Russia and Turkey have emerged, even if the latter’s significance is usually overstated. Thirdly, structural reasons within the EU helped the rise of illiberalism. The technocratic nature of the processes failed to capture the essence of democracy and to counter-act informalities, while the rise of member states blocking or misusing the EU accession process has aided the general decline in the attractiveness of EU membership. 

According to Bieber, we are at a critical juncture at the moment, presented with the opportunity for large-scale changes. The only question is in what direction these changes will lead. 

Adis Merdzanovic (St Antony’s College, Oxford)